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1. Bob Mottram (bob@social.freedombone.net)'s status on Friday, 13-Jan-2017 12:25:56 UTC Bob Mottram
   Reminder not to use closed source chat apps. https://social.freedombone.net/url/3531
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   • Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca (bobjonkmanformer@sn.jonkman.ca)'s status on Friday, 13-Jan-2017 17:50:08 UTC Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca

     in reply to
     OTOH: @WilliamTurton writes "…there’s no backdoor in WhatsApp, and according to Alec Muffett, an experienced security researcher who spoke to Gizmodo, the Guardian’s story is “major league fuckwittage.”" http://gizmodo.com/theres-no-security-backdoor-in-whatsapp-despite-report-1791158247
   • Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca (bobjonkmanformer@sn.jonkman.ca)'s status on Friday, 13-Jan-2017 17:57:22 UTC Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca

     in reply to

     • Cryptography
     • Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca
     But that re-keying attack seems like an easily fixed design flaw. The keys are already separate from the hardware, so a "clean" hardware replacement should include a transfer of key material from the old hardware to the new hardware so that re-keying queued messages is not necessary. Of course, now there's the vulnerability of exposing key material during the transfer, but that could be done requiring physical access, eg. a USB OTG cable, or Bluetooth pairing. No need to store the key material in The Cloud. !crypto